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We show that a biased quantum coin flip (QCF) cannot provide the performance of a black-boxed
biased coin flip, if it satisfies some fidelity conditions. Although such a QCF satisfies the security
conditions of a biased coin flip, it does not realize the ideal functionality, and therefore, does not
fulfill the demands for universally composable security. Moreover, through a comparison within a
small restricted bias range, we show that an arbitrary QCF is distinguishable from a black-boxed
coin flip unless it is unbiased on both sides of parties against insensitive cheating. We also point out
the difficulty in developing cheat-sensitive quantum bit commitment in terms of the uncomposability
of a QCF.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Mn
Consider Alice and Bob who have just divorced. They
agree to flip a coin to decide who gets their car, but they
live in different cities. How do they flip a coin by tele-
phone? This is a well-known introduction to a coin flip
[1], which is now an important cryptographic primitive
on a communication network. Another important prim-
itive is bit commitment (BC). The purpose of BC is to
realize the scenario in which Alice commits to a bit (b)
and later she reveals it; this is done such that Bob cannot
know b until Alice reveals it and she must reveal b as it
is. A fair coin flip is realized by using secure BC in the
following way: Alice first commits to b, Bob next sends
b′ to Alice, and she reveals b. Then, b⊕b′ is a fair random
bit, because Bob cannot know b before choosing b′ and
Alice cannot change b after knowing b′.
An effort was made to construct unconditionally se-
cure quantum BC (QBC), but unfortunately it was shown
that all previously proposed QBC protocols are broken
by the so called entanglement attack [2]. After contro-
versial discussions, it was then generally accepted that
unconditionally secure QBC is impossible [3]. It was also
proved that a perfectly fair quantum coin flip (QCF) is
impossible [4, 5, 6, 7].
Fortunately, quantum mechanics enables biased coin
flipping [6, 8, 9, 10, 11]. In a biased QCF, if both Al-
ice and Bob are honest, the outcome is either 0 or 1,
each with probability 1/2. A dishonest party can cheat
to bias the probability to 1/2+ǫ, but it is ensured that
the amount of the bias satisfies |ǫ| < 1/2; so a dishon-
est party cannot fully control the outcome. Moreover,
when a dishonest party tries to largely bias the probabil-
ity, a honest party sometimes obtains the outcome reject,
which conclusively identifies the presence of cheating. In
this paper, however, we only consider insensitive cheating
such that the outcome reject never occurs. Even through
insensitive cheating, a dishonest party can generally bias
the probability, whose maximum (or minimum) is called
the threshold for cheat sensitivity [9].
On the other hand, let us imagine ideal biased coin
flipping such that a black-box outputs a common ran-
dom bit to both parties. A dishonest party can bias the
probability of the outcome but can do nothing else be-
cause the party cannot touch the inside of the box at all.
A biased QCF, at first glance, realizes the black-boxed
coin flip, because it is ensured by the laws of physics that
the bias range is limited to |ǫ|< 1/2 against all possible
operations for cheating.
In this paper, however, we show that a biased QCF
generally does not provide the performance of a black-
boxed biased coin flip, when it is used to resolve a quan-
tum dilemma. Although such a QCF satisfies the se-
curity conditions of a biased coin flip, it does not realize
the ideal functionality. This warns that, if a QCF is com-
bined with another quantum cryptographic protocol, an
unexpected security hole will occur.
Now, let us introduce a quantum dilemma where, in
some sense, the car in the previous dilemma concerning
divorce is replaced with a fully quantum object: an en-
tangled state. Suppose that Alice is required to send half
of a maximally entangled state to Bob. However, Bob is
doubtful whether she sends the entangled state honestly.
On the other hand, dishonest Bob sometimes destroys the
shared entanglement and Alice worries about this. At a
later time, Bob wishes to confirm that Alice has honestly
sent the entangled state, and Alice wishes to confirm that
the entanglement has been maintained safely. Therefore,
both wish to get the whole state in her/his hand, be-
cause the entanglement cannot be evaluated from their
half of the state (this situation is analogous to quantum
bit escrow [8] as we will discuss later).
Since both wishes cannot be satisfied simultaneously,
let us introduce a coin flip to resolve this dilemma, and
thus consider the following protocol:
Protocol 1 (sharing and maintaining entanglement)
Stage 1 (sharing): Alice prepares |φ〉AB = (|00〉+
|11〉)/√2 and sends the B qubit to Bob. This maximal
entanglement is to be shared and maintained.
Stage 2 (coin flip): Alice and Bob execute a coin flip-
ping subprotocol. If the output of the subprotocol is 0
(1), Alice (Bob) loses the coin flip.
Stage 3 (verification): The winner of the coin flip ob-
tains both A and B qubits and checks whether or not
the state of the AB qubits is |φ〉 by a projective mea-
surement. If the state is not |φ〉, the party detects the
2cheating of the other party with nonzero probability.
Suppose that Alice is dishonest and sends a partially
entangled state |Φ(a)〉AB=
√
a|00〉+√1−a|11〉 (1/2<a≤
1) instead of |φ〉 in the stage 1. Let Pd be the probability
that Bob detects this cheating. The performance of the
protocol is characterized by the minimal value of Pd for
a given a. Let us consider the case where a black-boxed
coin flip is used in the stage 2. The allowable maximal
(minimal) bias of the probability of the outcome 0 is ǫmax
(ǫmin) and ǫmin < 0< ǫmax. Exploiting this controllable
bias range, Alice tries to decrease Pd. However, as proved
later, the best strategy is to constantly bias the proba-
bility to 1/2+ǫmin, and to send the A qubit as it is in the
stage 3, when she loses the coin flip. Namely,
Pd ≥ P boxd ≡ (12+ǫmin)tr
[|Φ(a)〉〈Φ(a)|(I−|φ〉〈φ|)]
= (12+ǫmin)(
1
2 −
√
a(1− a)). (1)
Our concern is whether or not a QCF can provide the
same performance. To investigate this, let us recall a
unitary model of a QCF [6, 7], where all classical com-
munication is replaced by quantum communication and
all measurements are postponed until the end of the pro-
tocol. We can thus assume that Alice or Bob’s operation
in each round is a unitary transformation. Following the
model in [6], let |ψini〉 be an initial state of the proto-
col. Alice first applies U1 to her own qubits and sends
some qubits to Bob, and then Bob applies U2 and sends
some qubits to Alice. They repeat this and the final
state after all the rounds is |ψfin〉 = (· · ·U3U2U1)|ψini〉.
Alice and Bob then measure |ψfin〉 to obtain the out-
come. When both are honest, they can obtain 0 or 1
with probability 1/2, and so |ψfin〉 is decomposed such
that |ψfin〉 = |ψ0〉+ |ψ1〉, where |ψc〉 is a part of lead-
ing to the outcome c, 〈ψ0|ψ1〉 = 0, and ‖ψc‖2 = 1/2.
Moreover, since both must know the outcome certainty,
F (̺X,0, ̺X,1)=0, where F (̺, σ)=(tr
√
̺1/2σ̺1/2)2 is the
fidelity and ̺X,c is the normalized reduced state of |ψc〉
for the party X=A,B [6].
Let ǫmax be the possible maximal bias for the out-
come 0 of this QCF, which is achieved if Alice ap-
plies U ′i instead of Ui. The final state is then |ψ′fin〉 =
(· · ·U ′3U2U ′1)|ψini〉 = |ψ′0〉+ |ψ′1〉, where 〈ψ′0|ψ′1〉 = 0 and
‖ψ′0‖2=1/2+ǫmax. Moreover, ̺′B,c, which is the reduced
state of |ψ′c〉, must not be conclusively distinguished from
̺B,c by Bob so that the cheating is insensitive [hence
supp(̺′B,c)⊂ supp(̺B,c) where supp(̺) denotes the sup-
port space of ̺]. Since Alice must know the outcome
certainty, F (̺′A,0, ̺
′
A,1)=0; otherwise the cheating is sen-
sitive due to the disagreement of their outcomes. Like-
wise, let ǫmin be the minimal bias that is achieved by
U ′′i . The corresponding final state, the reduced state,
and so on, are also indicated by the double prime. These
satisfy the same conditions as in the ǫmax case, except
‖ψ′′0‖2=1/2+ǫmin.
Now, let us consider Alice’s cheating strategy for the
protocol 1. In the QCF subprotocol executed in the stage
2, she applies the controlled unitary transformations
Oi = |0〉〈0|A⊗U ′′i + |1〉〈1|A⊗U ′i (2)
to |Φ(a)〉AB⊗|ψini〉. The whole state after all the rounds
of the QCF subprotocol is
√
a|00〉AB⊗(|ψ′′0 〉+|ψ′′1 〉) +
√
1−a|11〉AB⊗(|ψ′0〉+|ψ′1〉)
=
√
a|00〉AB⊗|ψ′′0 〉+
√
1− a|11〉AB⊗|ψ′0〉
+
√
a|00〉AB⊗|ψ′′1 〉+
√
1− a|11〉AB⊗|ψ′1〉. (3)
The first two and the last two terms in Eq. (3) lead to
the outcomes 0 and 1, respectively. Since Bob’s reduced
state of the system employed for the QCF is a̺′′B,c+(1−
a)̺′B,c for the outcome c, and supp(̺
′′
B,c), supp(̺
′
B,c) ⊂
supp(̺B,c), he knows the outcome certainty by a regular
measurement. Alice’s reduced state is a|0〉〈0|A⊗̺′′A,c+(1−
a)|1〉〈1|A⊗̺′A,c, and she can obtain the outcome certainty
using the projector |0〉〈0|A⊗Π′′c+|1〉〈1|A⊗Π′c, where Π′c
(Π′′c ) distinguishes ̺
′
A,0 and ̺
′
A,1 (̺
′′
A,0 and ̺
′′
A,1). These
projectors exist because F (̺′A,0, ̺
′
A,1)=F (̺
′′
A,0, ̺
′′
A,1)=0
[6]. Suppose that the outcome of the QCF is 0; the
state of the AB qubits will be checked by Bob in the
stage 3. Before Alice sends the A qubit to Bob, she ap-
plies |0〉〈0|A⊗ I + |1〉〈1|A⊗V , where V maximizes the
overlap between |ψ′′0 〉 and |ψ′0〉 such that |〈ψ′′0 |V |ψ′0〉|2=
‖ψ′′0 ‖2 ‖ψ′0‖2 F (̺′B,0, ̺′′B,0) [12]. Through this procedure,
the whole state becomes |Ψ0〉 =
√
a|00〉AB ⊗ |ψ′′0 〉 +√
1−a|11〉AB ⊗ V |ψ′0〉, and Pd in this strategy is
PQd = tr
[|Ψ0〉〈Ψ0|(I − |φ〉〈φ|)AB]
= 12
[
a(12+ǫmin) + (1−a)(12+ǫmax)
]
−[a(1−a)(12+ǫmin)(12+ǫmax)F
]1/2
(4)
where F ≡F (̺′B,0, ̺′′B,0). Comparing Eqs. (1) and (4), it
is found that PQd <P
box
d if 1>a>
(r−1)2
4(
√
rF−1)2+(r−1)2 and
F > 1/r ≡ (1 + 2ǫmin)/(1 + 2ǫmax). (5)
This result shows that, if a QCF has the property of
Eq. (5), there exists a finite range of a in which PQd <
P boxd . Therefore, it is concluded that such a QCF cannot
provide the performance of a black-boxed coin flip.
The point of the above cheating strategy is that it
is possible to superpose two biasing operations U ′i and
U ′′i . This enables to correlate the state of the AB qubits
with the outcome of the QCF such that the state is more
entangled than |Φ(a)〉AB whenever Alice loses the QCF
(and thus Pd decreases). For this purpose, Alice utilizes
the difference of ‖ψ′′0 ‖ and ‖ψ′0‖ (i.e., difference of ǫmax
and ǫmin). However, this procedure has created undesired
entanglement between the AB qubits and the system em-
ployed for the QCF, and so Alice needs to disentangle
them; otherwise the entanglement of the AB qubits will
be washed out by the undesired entanglement. This is
done by increasing the overlap between |ψ′0〉 and |ψ′′0 〉.
Note that the disentangling process is incomplete (unless
3F =1), and as a result, the state of the AB qubits (the
reduced state of |Ψ0〉) is a mixed state. Equation (5)
agrees with the condition that this mixed state is more
entangled than |Φ(a)〉 in the measure of negativity [13].
As shown above, a QCF does not provide the per-
formance of a black-boxed coin flip, if it satisfies Eq.
(5). To further investigate this, let us introduce the
following biasing operation: Suppose that Alice has a
local ancilla qubit and she prepares the initial state
|ψini〉 ⊗ (
√
1−x|0〉a +
√
x|1〉a) for the QCF, where the
subscript a denotes the ancilla qubit. Then, if she ap-
plies U˜i = Ui⊗|0〉〈0|a+U ′′i ⊗|1〉〈1|a to the initial state
[do not confuse this with Eq. (2)], the QCF is biased
by xǫmin. Moreover, when the outcome is 0, Bob’s re-
duced state is ˜̺B,0 = ̺B,0+x(̺
′′
B,0− ̺B,0), and hence
F (x)≡F (̺B,0, ˜̺B,0)=1−O(x2) [14]. Now, let us imagine
a special circumstance where Alice’s ability is restricted
such that she can only use U˜i for biasing the QCF (the
point is that she cannot directly employ U ′′i ). As a re-
sult, the bias of the QCF is restricted within [xǫmin, 0],
and therefore, it may be natural to compare it with the
black-boxed coin flip with the same bias range. Then, if
Alice adopts the cheating strategy like Eq. (2), where Ui
and U˜i are superposed as Oi= |0〉〈0|A⊗U˜i+ |1〉〈1|A⊗Ui
to decrease Pd, we have Eq. (5) in which ǫmax and ǫmin
is replaced by 0 and xǫmin, respectively; so P
Q
d < P
box
d
if F (x) > 1+2xǫmin. However, this fidelity condition is
always satisfied for x→ 0 because F (x) = 1−O(x2) as
mentioned above. The same discussion holds if the bias
is restricted within [0, xǫmax]. In this way, an arbitrary
QCF is distinguishable from a black-boxed coin flip (as
PQd <P
box
d ) unless the QCF is unbiased against insensi-
tive cheating (if we compare them around ǫ=0).
To see these results graphically, the following two
bounds are plotted in Fig. 1:
(I) F (ǫ) > 1/(1 + 2ǫ) for ǫmin=0 and ǫ=xǫmax≥0,
(II) F (ǫ) > 1 + 2ǫ for ǫmax=0 and ǫ=xǫmin≤0.
If the fidelity F of the QCF, whose bias is forcedly re-
stricted within (I) [0, ǫ] and (II) [ǫ, 0], is located out-
side the gray region, the QCF is distinguishable from
the black-boxed coin flip with the same bias range. The
fidelity for some of the proposed QCF protocols is also
plotted for a comparison.
All of the above discussions hold when Bob is dishon-
est. This is because the protocol 1 is essentially sym-
metric with respect to parties, if we assume that Bob’s
dishonest action in the stage 1 is to perform the following
positive operator valued measurement (POVM) of the B
qubit:
M0 =
√
a|0〉〈0|+√1−a|1〉〈1|,
M1 =
√
1−a|0〉〈0|+√a|1〉〈1|, (6)
whereM †0M0+M
†
1M1=1B. Depending on the outcome of
the POVM, the post-measured state becomes |Φ(a)〉AB
or |Φ(1−a)〉AB, each with probability 1/2. He then tries
to decrease Pd. For |Φ(a)〉, the same cheating strategy as
0−1/2 1/2
1 F
ε
[8]
[11]
1/2
[6]
(I)(II)
FIG. 1: Bound for fidelity (F ) as function of bias (ǫ). If a
QCF is located outside the gray region, it is distinguishable
from a black-boxed coin flip. The fidelity for the QCF pro-
tocols proposed in [8], [6], and [11] is also plotted, where we
assumed dishonest Bob. Two ends of each line correspond to
the maximal and minimal bias for each QCF protocol.
used with dishonest Alice is applicable. This is the case
for |Φ(1−a)〉, if the role of |0〉B and |1〉B is exchanged in
the controlled operations of the cheating strategy. Then,
we have the same bound for F ≡F (̺′A,1, ̺′′A,1), but ǫmax
and ǫmin must be read as those for the outcome 1 of
the QCF. This implies that a QCF must be unbiased on
both Alice and Bob’s sides simultaneously, so that it is
indistinguishable from a black-boxed coin flip.
So, let us now prove Eq. (1). The general action of
dishonest Alice when deciding on the bias of a black-
boxed coin flip is described by a POVM {Lǫ} of the A
qubit (
∫
dǫL†ǫLǫ=1A). The probability of the outcome 0
is then biased to 12+ǫ, and |Φ(a)〉AB will be checked by
Bob with this probability. Before sending the A qubit,
she can apply a trace-preserving operation regarding ǫ,
but this is included in Lǫ. Moreover, the singlet fraction
F(σ) = 〈φ|σ|φ〉 is bounded as F(σ) ≤ [trσ+NB(σ)]/2,
where NB(σ) is negativity [13] [the subscript denotes the
partial transposition with respect to the B qubit]. Since
NB is an entanglement monotone [15], the average cannot
be increased by the local operation of the POVM. Hence,
Pd =
∫ ǫmax
ǫmin
dǫ(12+ǫ)tr
[
Lǫ|Φ(a)〉〈Φ(a)|L†ǫ(I−|φ〉〈φ|)
]
≥ 12 (12+ǫmin)
[
1−
∫
dǫNB(Lǫ|Φ(a)〉〈Φ(a)|L†ǫ)
]
≥ 12 (12+ǫmin)
[
1−NB(|Φ(a)〉)
]
, (7)
and we have Eq. (1), because NB(|Φ(a)〉)=2
√
a(1−a).
So far, we have focused on the comparison through
Pd. Now, we concentrate on a case where Pd = 0; the
probability of detecting cheating is strictly zero, and so
the state of the AB qubits must be precisely |φ〉 when
it is checked in the stage 3. The performance of the
protocol 1 is then characterized by the maximal allowed
value of a for a dishonest party. Suppose again that Alice
is dishonest. For a black-boxed coin flip, it is found from
Eq. (1) that a= 12 must hold regardless of the bias range;
so she cannot cheat at all under Pd=0, as expected. For
a QCF, however, it is found from Eq. (4) that PQd = 0
even for a > 1/2 if F = 1. This occurs for an arbitrary
pair of biasing operations as far as the pair of operations
4satisfies F = 1. So, by replacing ǫmax and ǫmin in Eq.
(4) with ǫ′ and ǫ′′, respectively, we have PQd = 0 if a =
1/2+(ǫ′−ǫ′′)/[2(1+ǫ′+ǫ′′)] and F (̺′B,0, ̺′′B,0)=1. Basically,
if the QCF has a property of
∆a ≡ max
ǫ′,ǫ′′,F=1
ǫ′−ǫ′′
2(1+ǫ′+ǫ′′)
> 0, (8)
Alice can successfully cheat because a= 1/2+∆a> 1/2
while PQd =0. The maximization in Eq. (8) is taken over
all the pairs of the two biasing operations (ǫ′ and ǫ′′)
subject to F (̺′B,0, ̺
′′
B,0) = 1. Such a QCF also cannot
provide the performance of a black-boxed coin flip, and
even allows the cheating that is completely prohibited by
a black-boxed coin flip. Note that the same discussion
holds again for dishonest Bob [ǫ′ and ǫ′′ are those for the
outcome 1 and F (̺′A,1, ̺
′′
A,1)=1].
As a simple example, let us analyze the following pro-
tocol [16] (this is not a true QCF because the probability
of the outcome is not 1/2 even if both are honest, but
the above cheating strategy is applicable):
Protocol 2 (QCF like): Alice prepares |φ〉CD and sends
the D qubit to Bob. He optionally checks |φ〉CD (getting
the C qubit). If he uses the option, this protocol auto-
matically outputs 1. Otherwise, he measures the D qubit
in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis, sends the result to Alice, and she
confirms the validity by measuring the C qubit. This
protocol then outputs the measurement result.
In this protocol, it is confirmed that F (̺′A,1, ̺
′′
A,1)= 1
for Bob’s two biasing operations of (i) he always uses the
option (ǫ′=1/2), and (ii) he measures the D qubit, and if
the result is 1, he uses the option (ǫ′′=0). Hence, we have
∆a≥ 1/6 and a≥ 2/3 from Eq. (8). On the other hand,
it can be shown that a ≤ 2/3 for Bob’s general action
[17]. Therefore, it is found that the cheating strategy
considered in this paper has optimally maximized a under
Pd = 0. This is the case for the 3-round protocol in [8]
(a = cos π8 ) and for the optimal 3-round protocol in [6]
(a= 3/4), for which we assumed dishonest Bob. Apart
from the optimality of the strategy, the QCF protocols
of [9, 10, 11] also have the property of ∆a> 0, at least,
on either side of parties.
As mentioned before, the situation considered in this
paper is analogous to quantum bit escrow [8] (it is in fact
regarded as its entanglement version).
Protocol 3 (quantum bit escrow)
Stage 1 (commitment): To commit to b=0 (1), Alice
prepares either |0〉B or |−〉B (|1〉B or |+〉B), each with
probability 1/2, which is written as |ξbx〉 where x denotes
the encoding basis. She then sends the B qubit to Bob.
Stage 2 (opening): Alice reveals b.
Stage 3 (verification): Either Alice or Bob obtains the
B qubit and checks whether or not it is |ξbx〉 to detect
cheating (Alice reveals x if Bob checks the state).
This is a weak variant of QBC such that either Alice or
Bob can detect cheating with nonzero probability. The
question of whether or not it is possible to use a biased
QCF for the purpose of deciding which party will check
the B qubit in the stage 3 was raised in [8]. If this is so,
the resultant protocol is cheat-sensitive QBC (CSQBC)
[8, 16], which enables both to detect cheating, albeit with
smaller nonzero probability.
However, since the resultant CSQBC has the same
structure as in the protocol 1, it struggles with the dif-
ference between a QCF and a black-boxed coin flip. For
example, if ∆a>0, dishonest Bob can steal partial infor-
mation about b before the opening stage by a POVM like
in Eq. (6) (whose {|0〉, |1〉} basis is replaced by an appro-
priate one to steal the information [17]). Alice cannot
detect his cheating because he can precisely recover |ξbx〉
from a state collapsed by the POVM whenever he loses
the QCF, as he recovers |φ〉 from |Φ(a)〉 or |Φ(1−a)〉.
Likewise, if ∆a>0, dishonest Alice can change the prob-
ability of revealing b=0 in the opening stage [18]. There-
fore, a QCF that is combined with bit escrow should not
satisfy Eq. (8) on both sides of parties. Unfortunately,
this is not the case in the example of CSQBC suggested in
[8], and even in [16]. We described the cheating method
for those in [17]. Note that, as far as we know, an ex-
plicit protocol for secure CSQBC has not been found yet
[17], contrary to the widespread belief that CSQBC is
possible.
To summarize, we considered the problem of sharing
and maintaining entanglement between distrustful par-
ties, and showed that a QCF cannot provide the perfor-
mance of a black-boxed coin flip, if it satisfies the fidelity
conditions of Eqs. (5) or (8). Such a QCF obviously
does not fulfill the conditions for universally composable
(UC) security [19]; the demands for ensuring the secu-
rity of a cryptographic primitive regardless of how it is
used in applications [20]. This result is quite contrast to
quantum key distribution (QKD), where a QKD protocol
is automatically UC secure if it satisfies the general se-
curity conditions [21]. Moreover, through a comparison
within a small restricted bias range, we showed that an
arbitrary QCF is distinguishable from a black-boxed coin
flip unless it is unbiased on both sides of parties against
insensitive cheating, i.e., unless it is a cheat-sensitive un-
biased QCF. Finally, we discussed the relation to CSQBC
constructed from bit escrow and a QCF, and pointed out
the difficulty in developing secure CSQBC in terms of
the uncomposability condition of Eq. (8). We wish these
results could shed some light on the important open prob-
lem of whether or not quantum mechanics enables cheat-
sensitive bit commitment and cheat-sensitive unbiased
coin flipping.
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b, she can reveal b=0 with probability 1/2, because the
post measured states are |η0〉=α|00′〉+β|11′〉∝|+0〉+|−−〉
and |η1〉∝ | + +〉−| − 1〉 for E0 and E1=(I−E†0E0)1/2,
respectively. However, if she performs the POVM of
E′0=
√
α2+δ|0〉〈0|A+
p
β2+δ|1〉〈1|A, she can reveal b=0
with probability 1/2+δ, because she can precisely change
the post measured state into |ηb〉 whenever she loses the
QCF. The nonzero δ exists if ∆a>0.
[19] In the comparison through Pd, the probability of the out-
come is also different from each other. If the probability
is adjusted to a QCF, then P boxd increases, and a black-
boxed coin flip cannot simulate the QCF anyway.
[20] M. Ben-Or and D. Mayers, quant-ph/0409062.
[21] M. Ben-Or et al., Theory of Cryptography (Springer
Berlin, Heidelberg, 2005), pp. 386–406.
